Verifying existence of resource-bounded coalition uniform strategies by Alechina, Natasha et al.
Alechina, Natasha and Dastani, Mehdi and Logan, Brian 
(2016) Verifying existence of resource-bounded coalition 
uniform strategies. In: 25th International Joint 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 9-13 July 2016, 
New York, NY. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33113/1/paper2011%20%28002%29.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
Verifying Existence of Resource-Bounded Coalition Uniform Strategies
Natasha Alechina
University of Nottingham
nza@cs.nott.ac.uk
Mehdi Dastani
University of Utrecht
m.m.dastani@uu.nl
Brian Logan
University of Nottingham
bsl@cs.nott.ac.uk
Abstract
We consider the problem of whether a coalition of
agents has a knowledge-based strategy to ensure
some outcome under a resource bound. We extend
previous work on verification of multi-agent sys-
tems where actions of agents produce and consume
resources, by adding epistemic pre- and postcondi-
tions to actions. This allows us to model scenarios
where agents perform both actions which change
the world, and actions which change their knowl-
edge about the world, such as observation and com-
munication. To avoid logical omniscience and ob-
tain a compact model of the system, our model of
agents’ knowledge is syntactic. We define a class of
coalition-uniform strategies with respect to any (de-
cidable) notion of coalition knowledge. We show
that the model-checking problem for the result-
ing logic is decidable for any notion of coalition-
uniform strategies in these classes.
1 Introduction
We propose a new logical formalism, RB±ATSEL, for mod-
elling and verifying multi-agent systems where agents exe-
cute both ontic actions (actions that change the world) and
epistemic actions (actions that change their knowledge). This
is a common situation in many multi-agent systems where
agents have to explore and change their environment; for ex-
ample, knowledge-based planning, diagnosis, etc. As an ex-
ample, we focus on multi-agent systems where some agents
monitor the behaviour of other agents to detect norm viola-
tions [A´lvarez-Napagao et al., 2011]. We would like to be
able to automatically verify properties of such systems using
model-checking; for example, to check whether monitoring
agents have a strategy to detect all norm violations.
There has been considerable work on Alternating Time
Temporal Logic (ATL) extended with epistemic operators
and on the model-checking problem for the resulting logics,
e.g., [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002; Lomuscio et al.,
2009]. The motivation of this paper is closer to the work on
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) e.g., [Baltag et al., 1998;
van Ditmarsch and Kooi, 2008], and epistemic planning, e.g.,
[Andersen et al., 2012], where we can reason about how epis-
temic actions change the agents’ epistemic states, which is
impossible in epistemic ATL.
Our approach differs from previous work in two main re-
spects: the adoption of syntactic knowledge, and consider-
ing costs of both ontic and epistemic actions. We interpret
epistemic modalities syntactically rather than using an indis-
tinguishability relation. This allows us to use simpler mod-
els, and to model different (non-omniscient) reasoning proce-
dures for different agents. We also consider the costs of both
ontic and epistemic actions, such as observation and commu-
nication. Clearly ontic actions (e.g., moving from one loca-
tion to another) have costs (e.g., energy). However, observa-
tions often have non-trivial costs (e.g., an agent may need to
use costly equipment, or pay some authority for verified in-
formation [Jamroga and Tabatabaei, 2013; Naumov and Tao,
2015]). Exchanging messages also has costs, for example, en-
ergy, or money. This is particularly relevant for norm moni-
toring scenarios: a successful monitoring strategy may exist,
but could be prohibitively expensive and not practically fea-
sible. For this reason, we chose as the basis for our formalism
the logic RB±ATL, where actions produce and consume re-
sources [Alechina et al., 2014]. (If observations have a cost,
we need to model resource production if monitoring is to be
performed indefinitely.) Using RB±ATL allows us to check
whether a strategy that requires less than a given amount
of resources exists. However Alechina et al. [2014] consider
only the resource consumption of ontic actions.
The notion of strategies we consider are perfect recall
strategies, where the choice of the next action by an agent
depends on all previously encountered states. Perfect recall
strategies make more sense than memoryless strategies in our
setting, as actions both produce and consume resources. (In-
tuitively, this is because an agent may need to ‘loop’ several
times making some resource in order to execute an action that
consumes the resource, e.g., recharging a battery for several
timesteps.) In addition, strategies should also be uniform; that
is, if an agent has the same knowledge at each point in two
histories, then it should chose the same action in both of them.
However, model-checking epistemic ATL with uniform per-
fect recall strategies and more than one agent is undecidable
[Dima and Tiplea, 2011]. This result does not change for syn-
tactic epistemics. We therefore propose a notion of coalition-
uniform strategies for which the model-checking problem is
decidable. A strategy is coalition-uniform for a coalition A if
for any two histories indistinguishable for A (wrt some no-
tion of indistinguishability), it chooses the same action. We
call the resulting logic Resource-Bounded Alternating Time
Syntactic Epistemic Logic (RB±ATSEL). The main contri-
bution of this paper is a decidable model-checking procedure
for RB±ATSEL with coalition-uniform strategies (wrt any
decidable notion of indistinguishability).
2 Syntax and Semantics of RB±ATSEL
We adopt the approach to epistemic logic that interprets
agents’ knowledge syntactically, as a (finite) set of formu-
las, as in, e.g., [Konolige, 1986]. An agent knows that φ if,
and only if, φ is in its knowledge base or is derivable from
it by some simple terminating procedure (e.g., closure under
modus ponens). This approach is very close to the notion of
algorithmic knowledge of Fagin et al. [1995]. In what fol-
lows, to decide whether the agent knows φ, we simply check
whether a formula φ is in agent i’s state si, but this can be
trivially replaced with a check for alg(si, φ) = true, where
alg is a terminating procedure that takes a set of formulas si
and a formula φ and checks whether φ follows from si.
Syntactic knowledge provides a convenient and compact
way of modelling knowledge change, compared to, for ex-
ample, DEL. In DEL, the update mechanism involves com-
bining models to produce new models, and requires consider-
ably more space to represent and more computation to reason
about. In the syntactic approach, we can simply specify post-
conditions of actions which add and remove formulas from
the agent’s state. In DEL, we need to essentially associate an
automaton with each action that can transform an epistemic
model into a new epistemic model. Finally, it is worth noting
that many epistemic planners use what are essentially syntac-
tic knowledge bases (and as a result solve a decidable plan-
ning problem), e.g., [Petrick and Bacchus, 2004]. This con-
trasts with the undecidability of DEL-based epistemic plan-
ning [Aucher and Bolander, 2013].
The language of RB±ATSEL is built from the follow-
ing components: Agt = {a1, . . . , an} a set of n agents;
Res = {res1, . . . , resr} a set of r resources; and Π a set
of propositions. B = Agt × Res → N∞ is a set of resource
bounds, where N∞ = N ∪ {∞}. (Note that the definition of
bound and related definitions differ from those in [Alechina
et al., 2014] as we assume resources can’t be transferred be-
tween agents.)
Formulas of the language L of RB±ATSEL are defined by
the following syntax ϕ,ψ ::=
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | 〈〈Ab〉〉©ϕ | 〈〈Ab〉〉ϕU ψ | 〈〈Ab〉〉2ϕ | Kaϕ
where p ∈ Π is a proposition, A ⊆ Agt, b ∈ B is a resource
bound and a ∈ Agt.
The meaning of RB±ATSEL formulas is as follows:
〈〈Ab〉〉©ϕ means that a coalition A has a strategy executable
within resource bound b to ensure that the next state satisfies
ϕ; 〈〈Ab〉〉ϕU ψ means that A has a strategy executable within
resource bound b to ensure ψ while maintaining the truth of
ϕ; 〈〈Ab〉〉2ϕ means that A has a strategy executable within
resource bound b to ensure that ϕ is always true; and Kaϕ
means that formula ϕ is in agent a’s knowledge base.
Definition 1. A model of RB±ATSEL is a structure M =
(Φ, Agt,Res, S,Π, Act, d, c, δ) where:
• Φ is a finite set of formulas of L.
• S is a set of tuples (s1, . . . , sn, se) where se ⊆ Π and
for each a ∈ Agt, sa ⊆ Φ.
• Agt is a non-empty set of n agents, Res is a non-empty
set of r resources.
• Π is a finite set of propositional variables; p ∈ Π is true
in s ∈ S iff p ∈ se.
• Act is a non-empty set of actions which includes idle,
and d : S × Agt → ℘(Act) \ {∅} is a function which
assigns to each s ∈ S a non-empty set of actions avail-
able to each agent a ∈ Agt. We assume that for ev-
ery s ∈ S and a ∈ Agt, idle ∈ d(s, a). We de-
note joint actions by all agents in Agt available at s by
D(s) = d(s, a1)× · · · × d(s, an).
• for every s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈ Agt, d(s, a) = d(s′, a) if sa =
s′a.
• c : Act × Res → Z is the function which mod-
els consumption and production of resources by actions
(a positive integer means consumption, a negative one
production). Let consres(α) = max(0, c(α, res)) and
prodres(α) = −min(0, c(α, res)). We stipulate that
c(idle, res) = 0 for all res ∈ Res.
• δ : S × Actn → S is a partial function which for ev-
ery s ∈ S and joint action σ ∈ D(s) returns the state
resulting from executing σ in s.
We denote by DA(s) the set of all joint actions by agents
in coalition A at s. Let σ be a joint action by agents in A.
The set of outcomes of this joint action in s is the set of states
reached when A executes σ: out(s, σ) = {s′ ∈ S | ∃σ′ ∈
D(s) : σ = σ′A ∧ s′ = δ(s, σ′)} (where s′A is the restriction
of σ′ to A). A strategy for a coalition A ⊆ Agt is a map-
ping FA : S+ → Act|A| (from finite non-empty sequences
of states to joint actions by A) such that, for every λs ∈ S+,
FA(λs) ∈ DA(s). A computation λ ∈ Sω is consistent with a
strategy FA iff, for all i ≥ 0, λ[i+1] ∈ out(λ[i], FA(λ[0, i])).
Overloading notation, we denote the set of all computations
λ consistent with FA that start from s by out(s, FA). Given a
bound b ∈ B, a computation λ ∈ out(s, FA) is b-consistent
with FA iff, for every i ≥ 0, for every a ∈ A,
j=i−1∑
j=0
tot(Fa(λ[0, j])) + ba ≥ cons(Fa(λ[0, i]))
where Fa(λ[0, j]) is a’s action as part of the joint ac-
tion returned by FA for the sequence of states λ[0, j];
tot(σ) = prod(σ) − cons(σ) is the (vector) difference be-
tween the vector prod(σ) = (prod1(σ), . . . , prodr(σ)) of re-
source amounts action σ produces and the vector of resource
amounts cons(σ) it consumes; ba is a′s resource bound in b.
This condition requires that the amount of resources a accu-
mulated on the path so far, plus the original bound, is greater
than or equal to the cost of executing the next action by a
in the strategy. FA is a b-strategy if all λ ∈ out(s, FA) are
b-consistent.
In the presence of imperfect information, it makes sense
to consider only uniform strategies rather than arbitrary ones.
A strategy is uniform if after epistemically indistinguishable
histories, agents select the same actions. Two states s and t
are epistemically indistinguishable by agent a, denoted by
s ∼a t, if a has the same local state (knows the same for-
mulas) in s and t: s ∼a t iff sa = ta. For a coalition A, indis-
tinguishability s ∼A s′ means that A as a whole has the same
knowledge in the two states. Various notions of coalitional
knowledge can be used to define ∼A. For example, s ∼A t
iff
⋃
a∈A sa =
⋃
a∈A ta (the distributed knowledge of A in s
and t is the same). Another possible definition of s ∼A t is
∀a ∈ A(sa = ta).∼A can be lifted to histories in the obvious
way: s1, . . . , sk ∼A t1, . . . , tk iff for all j ∈ [1, k], sj ∼A tj .
Definition 2. A strategy FA for A is coalition-uniform with
respect to ∼A if for all s¯ ∼A t¯, FA(s¯) = FA(t¯).
Note that any notion of action choice based on coalition
knowledge presupposes that agents in the coalition share
knowledge for the purpose of action selection. In other words,
there is a ‘silent step’ before action selection when agents
in the coalition can communicate with each other instanta-
neously and without any cost. The only explicit and poten-
tially resource consuming communication actions which may
be necessary for a successful strategy are actions communi-
cating with agents outside of the coalition.
The truth definition for RB±ATSEL with coalition-
uniform strategies (parameterised by ∼A) is as follows:
• M, s |= p iff p ∈ se
• boolean connectives have standard truth definitions
• M, s |= 〈〈Ab〉〉©φ iff ∃ coalition-uniform b-strategy FA
such that for all λ ∈ out(s, FA): M,λ[1] |= φ
• M, s |= 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ iff ∃ coalition-uniform b-strategy
FA such that for all λ ∈ out(s, FA), ∃i ≥ 0: M,λ[i] |=
ψ and M,λ[j] |= φ for all j ∈ {0, . . . , i− 1}
• M, s |= 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ iff ∃ coalition-uniform b-strategy FA
such that for all λ ∈ out(s, FA) and i ≥ 0:M,λ[i] |= φ.
• M, s |= Kaφ iff φ ∈ sa
Note that we do not impose any conditions on the syntac-
tic knowledge (not consistency, not veracity etc.). Of course,
in a particular modelling scenario such conditions may be im-
posed. The general results for decidability of model-checking
stated below hold for such special cases too. They also hold
for strong coalition uniformity where the truth definition for
coalition modalities requires the existence of a coalition-
uniform strategy from every indistinguishable state. For ex-
ample, for M, s |= 〈〈Ab〉〉©φ strong coalition uniformity re-
quires that ∀s′ ∼A s, ∃ coalition-uniform b-strategy FA such
that for all λ ∈ out(s′, FA): M,λ[1] |= φ.
3 Model-Checking RB±ATSEL
In this section, we prove the following general result:
Theorem 1. The model-checking problem for RB±ATSEL
with coalition-uniform strategies, with respect to any decid-
able notion of ∼A, is decidable.
To prove decidability we give an algorithm which, given
a structure M = (Φ, Agt,Res, S,Π, Act, d, c, δ) and a
formula φ0, returns the set of states [φ0]M satisfying φ0:
[φ0]M = {s |M, s |= φ0}. The theorem follows from Lem-
mas 1 and 2 which establish termination and correctness of
the algorithm respectively.
Algorithm 1 Labelling φ0
1: function RB±ATSEL-LABEL(M,φ0)
2: for φ′ ∈ Sub(φ0) do
3: case φ′ = p, ¬φ, φ ∨ ψ standard, see
[Alur et al., 2002]
4: case φ′ = Kaφ
5: [φ′]M ← { s | s ∈ S ∧ φ ∈ sa}
6: case φ′ = 〈〈Ab〉〉©φ
7: [φ′]M ← Pre(A, [φ]M , b)
8: case φ′ = 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ
9: [φ′]M ← { s | s ∈ S ∧
UNTIL([node0(s, b)], { }, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ)}
10: case φ′ = 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ
11: [φ′]M ← { s | s ∈ S ∧
BOX([node0(s, b)], { }, 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ)}
12: return [φ0]M
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Given φ0, we pro-
duce a set of subformulas Sub(φ0) of φ0 in the usual way (but
excluding subformulas in the scope of a knowledge modal-
ity), ordered in increasing order of complexity. We then pro-
ceed by cases. For all formulas in Sub(φ) apart from Kaφ,
〈〈Ab〉〉©φ, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ and 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ (where b may contain
∞) we essentially run the standard ATL model-checking al-
gorithm [Alur et al., 2002]. Labelling states with 〈〈Ab〉〉©φ
makes use of a function Pre(A, ρ, b) which, given a coali-
tion A, a set ρ ⊆ S and a bound b, returns a set of states s
in which A has a joint action σA with cons(σA) ≤ b such
that out(s, σA) ⊆ ρ. Labelling states with 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ and
〈〈Ab〉〉2φ is more complex, and in the interests of readability
we provide separate functions: UNTIL for 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ formu-
las is shown in Algorithm 2, and BOX for 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ formulas
is shown in Algorithm 3.
Both algorithms proceed by depth-first and-or search on
M . Information about the state of the search is recorded in
a search tree of nodes. A node is a structure which consists
of a state of M (including the epistemic states of the agents),
the resources available to the agents A in that state (if any),
and a finite path of nodes leading to this node from the root
node. Edges in the tree correspond to joint actions by agents
in A and are labelled with the action taken. Note that the re-
sources available to the agents in a state s on a path constrain
the edges from the corresponding node to be those actions
σA where cons(σA) is less than or equal to the available re-
sources. For each node n in the tree, we have a function s(n)
which returns its state, p(n) which returns the nodes on the
path to n, and a(n) which returns the joint action taken by A
to reach s(n) (i.e., the label of the edge to n from its predeces-
sor). The function ei,k(n) returns the resource availability on
the i-th resource in s(n) for agent k ∈ A as a result of follow-
ing p(n). The function node0(s, b) returns the root node, i.e.,
a node n0 such that s(n0) = s, p(n0) = [ ], a(n0) = no-op,
and ei,k(n0) = bi,k for all resources i and agents k ∈ A. The
function node(n, σ, s′) returns a node n′ where s(n′) = s′,
p(n′) = [p(n) · n], a(n′) = σ, and for all resources i and
agents k ∈ A, ei,k(n′) = ei,k(n) + prodi(σk) − consi(σk).
In addition, we assume functions hd(u), tl(u) which return
the head and tail of a list u, and u ◦ v which concatenates
the lists u and v. (We abuse notation slightly, and treat sets as
lists, e.g., use hd(u) where u is a set, to return an arbitrary
element of u, and use ◦ between a set and a list.)
Algorithm 2 Labelling 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ
1: function UNTIL(B,C, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ)
2: if B = [ ] then
3: return true
4: n← hd(B)
5: if ∃n′ ∈ p(n) : s(n′) = s(n) ∧
(∀i, k : ei,k(n′) ≥ ei,k(n)) then
6: return false
7: for i, k ∈ {i ∈ Res, k ∈ A | ∃n′ ∈ p(n) :
s(n′) = s(n) ∧ ei,k(n′) < ei,k(n) ∧
(∀j,m : ej,m(n′) ≤ ej,m(n))} do
8: ei,k(n)←∞
9: if s(n) ∈ [ψ]M then
10: return UNTIL(tl(B), C ∪ {n}, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ)
11: if s(n) 6∈ [φ]M then
12: return false
13: if ∃n′ ∈ C : p(n) · n ∼A p(n′)[1, |p(n) · n|] then
14: σ ← a(p(n′)[|p(n) · n|+ 1]
15: if σ ∈ DA(s(n)) ∧ cons(σ) ≤ e(n) then
16: P ← {node(n, σ, s′) | s′ ∈ out(s(n), σ)}
17: return UNTIL(P ◦ tl(B), C, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ)
18: else
19: ActA← {σ ∈ DA(s(n)) | cons(σ) ≤ e(n)}
20: for σ ∈ ActA do
21: P ← {node(n, σ, s′) | s′ ∈ out(s(n), σ)}
22: if UNTIL(P ◦ tl(B), C, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ) then
23: return true
24: return false
UNTIL (Algorithm 2) takes a stack (list) of ‘open’ nodesB,
a set of ‘closed’ nodes C, and a formula φ′ = 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ ∈
Sub(φ0) as input. If there are no more open nodes to con-
sider, UNTIL returns true, indicating that a strategy exists to
enforce 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ. Otherwise we check whether the state
s(n) has been encountered before on p(n), i.e., p(n) ends
in a loop. If the loop is unproductive (i.e., resource avail-
ability has not increased since the previous occurrence of
s(n) on the path p(n)), then the loop is not necessary for a
successful strategy, and search on this branch is terminated.
If, on the other hand, the loop strictly increases the avail-
ability of at least one resource i for some agent k and does
not decrease the availability of other resources, then ei,k(n)
is replaced with ∞ as a shorthand denoting that any finite
amount of i can be produced by repeating the loop sufficiently
many times. We then check if the second argument ψ of φ′ is
true in s(n). If so, search terminates on the current branch,
and continues on a different branch by expanding the next
open node in B and adding the current node n to the set of
closed nodes. Note that we only add ‘successful’ branches
to the closed set rather than all visited nodes, as search pro-
ceeds depth-first. Coalition uniformity is ensured if action
choices are consistent with those taken in ∼A states on all
successful paths explored to date (n1, . . . , nk ∼A n′1, . . . , n′k
iff s(n1), . . . , s(nk) ∼A s(n′1), . . . , s(n′k)). If the current
branch is not closed (i.e., the second argument ψ of φ′ is not
true in s(n), but φ is true in s(n)), search continues on this
branch. First we check if the current path (including the cur-
rent node) is epistemically indistinguishable from a (prefix
of) a path to a closed node ρ. If so, for a coalition-uniform
strategy, the same action, σ, should be selected in the current
state as in the corresponding state in ρ. (We use p(n′)[i] to de-
note the i-th node in the path p(n′), and p(n′)[1, j] to denote
the prefix of p(n′) up to the j-th node.) If the cost of the action
σ is less than the resource availability in the current state, we
generate a new node for each possible outcome state of the ac-
tion, and call UNTIL recursively to continue the search, push-
ing the nodes corresponding to the successor states onto the
stack of open paths. If the cost of the required action is greater
than the current resource availability, search terminates on the
current branch with false. If no action is required at the cur-
rent state for coalition uniformity, then for each action that is
possible in the current state given the current resource avail-
ability, we attempt to find a strategy for each of the outcome
states of that action. If a strategy cannot be found for any ac-
tion possible in s(n), UNTIL returns false.
Algorithm 3 Labelling 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ
1: function BOX(B,C, 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ)
2: if B = [ ] then
3: return true
4: n← hd(B)
5: if s(n) 6∈ [φ]M then
6: return false
7: if ∃n′ ∈ p(n) : s(n′) = s(n) ∧
(∀j, k : ej,k(n′) ≥ ej,k(n)) ∧
(∃j, k : ej,k(n′) > ej,k(n)) then
8: return false
9: if ∃n′ ∈ p(n) : s(n′) = s(n) ∧
(∀j, k : ej,k(n′) ≤ ej,k(n)) then
10: return BOX(tl(B), C ∪ {n}, 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ)
11: if ∃n′ ∈ C : p(n) · n ∼A p(n′)[1, |p(n) · n|] then
12: σ ← a(p(n′)[|p(n) · n|+ 1]
13: if σ ∈ DA(s(n)) ∧ cons(σ) ≤ e(n) then
14: P ← {node(n, σ, s′) | s′ ∈ out(s(n), σ)}
15: return BOX(P ◦ tl(B), C, 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ)
16: else
17: ActA← {σ ∈ DA(s(n)) | cons(σ) ≤ e(n)}
18: for σ ∈ ActA do
19: P ← {node(n, σ, s′) | s′ ∈ out(s(n), σ)}
20: if BOX(P ◦ tl(B), C, 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ) then
21: return true
22: return false
BOX (Algorithm 3) takes a stack (list) of ‘open’ nodes B,
a set of ‘closed’ nodes C, and a formula φ′ = 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ ∈
Sub(φ0) as input. If there are no more open nodes to con-
sider, BOX returns true. It then checks if φ is false in the state
s(n). If so, it returns false immediately, terminating search
of the current branch of the search tree. Otherwise we check
whether the state s(n) has been encountered before on p(n),
i.e., p(n) ends in a loop. For BOX the loop check is slightly
different. If the loop decreases the amount of at least one re-
source for one agent without increasing the availability of any
other resource, it cannot form part of a successful strategy,
and the search terminates returning false. If a non-decreasing
loop is found, then it is possible to maintain the invariant
formula φ forever without expending any resources, and the
search terminates on the current branch and continues on a
different branch by expanding the next open node in B and
adding the current node n to the set of closed nodes. The
remaining cases are similar to UNTIL. If the current branch
is not closed, search continues on the branch, first checking
whether an action is required for the strategy to be coalition-
uniform, and, if not, for each action that is possible in the
current state given the current resource availability.
Lemma 1 (Termination). Algorithm 1 terminates.
Proof. All the cases in Algorithm 1 apart from the calls to
Algorithms 2 and 3 clearly terminate. It therefore suffices to
show that the calls to Algorithms 2 and 3 terminate.
In order to prove termination, we first show (Claim 1) that
on each path explored by Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3 there
is no infinite loop where nodes with the same state and in-
comparable e(n) occur. This implies that the tree explored
for each element of B is of finite depth, since the number of
states is finite and repeated states will necessarily occur in
the search, and if the resource availability vectors are com-
parable the search will terminate for that node. Algorithm 2
returns false for a non-increasing loop on line 6, and resets
resource availability to∞ on line 8 for an increasing loop; if
the same resource-increasing loop is encountered again with
all resources set to∞ or unchanged, the algorithm will return
false on line 6. Algorithm 3 terminates returning false on line
8 if the loop is decreasing, and calls itself on the next mem-
ber of B on line 10 if the loop is non-decreasing. Second, we
show that (Claim 2) there cannot be infinitely many recur-
sive calls generated by calls on line 10 of Algorithm 2 and
of Algorithm 3. We do this by showing that the list B con-
taining paths that must be checked with respect to a currently
successful strategy, will eventually become empty. Together,
these two claims provide the proof of the lemma, because they
guarantee that after a finite number of recursive calls both al-
gorithms terminate.
Claim 1: Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 cannot generate a
path where nodes with the same state and incomparable e(n)
occur infinitely often.
This part of the termination proof is similar to that in
[Alechina et al., 2014] which in turn is similar to the proof
of Lemma f in [Reisig, 1985, p.70], and proceeds by induc-
tion on the number of resource/agent pairs m. For m = 1,
since e(n) is always positive, the claim is immediate. Assume
the claim holds for m and let us show it for m + 1. In other
words, the first m positions in e(n) will eventually become
comparable. Then the m + 1 position will become compara-
ble since there are only finitely many positive integers which
are smaller than a given em+1(n).
Claim 2. There can be only finitely many calls generated
by the coalition uniformity check (line 13 of Algorithm 2 and
line 11 of Algorithm 3).
Here we need to show that the open list B is used to ex-
plore a finite tree, hence B will eventually become empty.
The depth of this tree is bounded by the depth of the longest
possible path. Since the relation ∼A only holds between the
paths of the same length, Claim 1 is sufficient to limit the
depth of the tree. The finite branching factor of the tree fol-
lows from the fact that the set out(s, σA) is always finite.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Given a model M , a state s in M
and a formula φ, Algorithm 1 labels s with φ iff M, s |= φ.
Proof. The proof for all the cases in Algorithm 1 apart from
the calls to Algorithms 2 and 3 is straightforward.
Let us look at the case for 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ. We need to show
that a call to UNTIL([node0(s, b)], { }, 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ) returns
true if, and only if, M, s |= 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ and similarly for
〈〈Ab〉〉2φ. By inductive hypothesis, the algorithm only ex-
plores paths where φ holds (line 11) until ψ is encountered
(line 9), so the pure temporal semantics of U is respected.
Note that it is enough to find a finite strategy which is guaran-
teed to achieve a state where ψ is true. After that, the agents
can select the idle action in all subsequent histories, which
both ensures coalition uniformity and does not require any re-
sources. The proof as regards resource bounds (and whether
it is safe to reset a bound to∞ when a productive loop is en-
countered, and explore a productive loop only once) is simi-
lar to the one for RB±ATL [Alechina et al., 2014]. However,
in addition we need to show that the algorithms return true
if and only if there is a satisfying coalition-uniform strategy.
Assume that the algorithm returns true. We need to show that
the strategy found is coalition-uniform. This is ensured by
the check on line 13. A current successful strategy is kept in
the closed set C, and for all coalition-indistinguishable paths
we check whether the same strategy returns true, and only
then return true, otherwise we backtrack and try another strat-
egy. For the other direction, assume that there is a coalition-
uniform strategy for A to enforce 〈〈Ab〉〉φU ψ. An inspection
of Algorithm 2 shows that if such a strategy exists, then there
exists a sequence of recursive calls by the algorithm (corre-
sponding to the choice of actions given by the strategy) which
results in the algorithm returning true.
The case of 〈〈Ab〉〉2φ is similar. We ensure that Algorithm
3 returns a coalition-uniform strategy by an identical check
on line 11.
4 Verifying Norm Monitoring Strategies
In this section, we show how RB±ATSEL can be used to rea-
son about knowledge-based resource bounded strategies in
a simple norm monitoring scenario. In the scenario, agents
monitor and enforce a norm that visitors to a museum are
prohibited from getting too close to the artwork on display:
if a visitor approaches the artwork, s/he is warned; if s/he ap-
proaches again after being warned, s/he is required to leave
the museum. For simplicity, we assume the museum has a
single exhibition room, there are two monitoring agents 1 and
2, and one visitor 3. At each timestep, the visitor can perform
an idle action or approach the artwork, app. Agents 1 and 2
can perform an idle action, an observation action, obs, issue
a warning warn, escort the visitor out of the museum rem,
or recharge their battery gen. The agents require a single re-
source, energy. The gen action produces energy; all other ac-
tions apart from idle consume energy.
We use propositions a to denote that the visitor has ap-
proached the artwork, ci (i ∈ {1, 2}) to denote that agent
i has just charged their battery, w to denote that the visitor
has been warned, and r to denote that the visitor has been
removed from the museum. The global system state is repre-
sented by s = (s1, s2, s3, se), where si (i = {1, 2, 3}) is the
local state of i, and se is the state of the environment. The set
of formulas Φ which constitute possible contents of agents’
states includes information on whether the agents have (just)
charged, whether the visitor has approached the artwork, been
warned, or removed from the museum.
The museum scenario can be modelled by the structure
M = (Φ, Agt,Res, S,Π, Act, d, c, δ), where Φ = {a, c1, c2,
r, w}, Agt = {1, 2, 3}, Res = {energy}, S = 2{a,c1,w} ×
2{a,c2,w} × 2{r,w} × 2Π, Π = {a, c1, c2, w, r}, Act = {idle,
app, obs, warn, rem, gen}.
d is defined for all s ∈ S as follows:
1. idle ∈ d(s, i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
2. app ∈ d(s, 3) iff r 6∈ s3
3. obs ∈ d(s, i) for all i ∈ {1, 2}
4. gen ∈ d(s, i) for all i ∈ {1, 2}
5. warn ∈ d(s, i) for all i ∈ {1, 2} iff a ∈ si (a warn-
ing is only issued if a monitor knows the visitor has ap-
proached the artwork)
6. rem ∈ d(s, i) for all i ∈ {1, 2} iff a,w ∈ si (the visitor
is only removed if s/he approaches the artwork and a
warning has been issued)
c(idle, energy) = 0, c(gen, energy) = −2, c(α, energy) =
1 for α ∈ Act \ {idle, gen}
δ is defined based on the following post conditions of actions
(action preconditions are given by d):
1. idle performed by agent i ∈ {1, 2} removes ci from si
and se; idle performed by agent 3 removes a from se
2. app performed by agent 3 adds a to the state of the en-
vironment
3. obs performed by agent i ∈ {1, 2} removes ci from si
and se, and, if performed in a state where a is true (false),
adds (removes) a to (from) i’s local state
4. warn performed by agent i ∈ {1, 2} removes ci from si
and se, and adds w to s1, s2, s3 and se
5. rem performed by agent i ∈ {1, 2} removes ci from si
and se, and adds r to s3, se
6. gen performed by agent i ∈ {1, 2} adds ci to si and se
The following property states that if the visitor approaches
the artwork, then this will be known by one of the monitoring
agents in the next state:
〈〈{1, 2}1,0〉〉2(a→ 〈〈{1, 2}0,0〉〉©(K1a ∨K2a)).
This formula is true for a notion of coalition uniformity based
on distributed knowledge of the coalition. The strategy is as
follows: agents take turns charging and observing; agent 1
chooses obs in the state where both agents’s states don’t con-
tain ci, hence it needs 1 unit of energy to start with. The fol-
lowing properties state that the monitoring agents are able to
warn the visitor in two steps after the visitor’s approach, and
that after being warned, the visitor will be removed directly
after another approach. They are true under the same notion
of coalition uniformity.
φw = 〈〈{1, 2}1,0〉〉2(a→ 〈〈{1, 2}0,0〉〉©(〈〈{1, 2}0,0〉〉©w))
〈〈{1, 2}1,0〉〉2(w → φr), where φr = φw[w/r].
5 Related Work
The motivation of work on epistemic logics where acquir-
ing information requires resources [Jamroga and Tabatabaei,
2013; Naumov and Tao, 2015] is very similar to ours, how-
ever the technical approach is very different. In [Jamroga and
Tabatabaei, 2013], a set of states an agent considers possi-
ble is updated by observations (which eliminate some states),
and observations have resource costs. The logic introduced
in the paper can express statements such as ‘i can poten-
tially achieve knowledge of whether φ is true under resource
bound b’. In [Naumov and Tao, 2015], edges in an epistemic
indistinguishability relation have weights corresponding to
the costs of removing them (obtaining information which
would distinguish the states). This allows the authors to de-
fine weighted knowledge operators which represent the costs
of coming to know whether some proposition is true.
Other related work falls broadly into three categories: work
on model-checking resource logics (without epistemics),
work on model-checking epistemic ATL (under standard se-
mantics for epistemics and without knowledge change), and
work on model-checking DEL and epistemic planning. There
exist several formalisms that extend Alternating Time Tempo-
ral Logic (ATL), [Alur et al., 2002] with reasoning about re-
sources available to agents and production and consumption
of resources by actions. When the production of resources is
allowed, the model-checking problem for many (but not all)
of these logics is undecidable (for a survey, see [Alechina et
al., 2015]). Epistemic ATL has been studied extensively, see
e.g., [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002; A˚gotnes, 2006;
Lomuscio et al., 2009; Guelev et al., 2011; Dima and Tiplea,
2011]. Its model-checking problem with perfect recall and
uniform strategies was shown to be undecidable in the case of
more than one agent in [Dima and Tiplea, 2011]. In [Guelev
et al., 2011], it was shown that if uniform strategies are de-
fined in terms of distributed knowledge of the coalition, the
model-checking problem becomes decidable. The technique
used to prove this is very different from the one used in this
paper. Various notions of coalition uniformity were studied
in [van Ditmarsch and Knight, 2014], and justified for a set-
ting where agents in a coalition share their information; the
model-checking problem for the resulting logic was not con-
sidered. There is a large body of work on DEL. The model-
checking problem for full DEL was shown to be undecid-
able in [Aucher and Bolander, 2013] and decidable for a
fragment of DEL in [Aucher and Schwarzentruber, 2013].
DEL-based epistemic planning is also undecidable in gen-
eral, but is tractable for some special cases [Yu et al., 2013;
Bolander et al., 2015].
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